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WILLIAM L. ROWE'S A PRIORI 
ARGUMENT FOR ATHEISM 
KlaasJ.Kraay 
William Rowe's a posteriori arguments for the non-existence of God are well-
known. Rather less attention has been given, however, to Rowe's intriguing a 
priori argument for atheism. In this paper, I examine the three published 
responses to Rowe's a priori argument (due to Bruce Langtry, William Morris, 
and Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, respectively). I conclude that none is 
decisive, but I show that Rowe's argument nevertheless requires more defence 
than he provides. 
The hypothesis of no prime worlds (NPW) holds that for any possible 
world x that an omnipotent being has the power to actualize, there is a 
better world, y, that the omnipotent being could have actualized instead 
of X.I NPW is generally deployed to defend theism against the charge 
that God failed to do his best in actualizing this world.2 Sometimes this 
view is deployed to defend theism against the charge that God failed to 
do better in actualizing this world.3 These defences are compelling, and, 
accordingly, critics of theism have developed new anti-theistic argu-
ments on NPW. Most anti-theistic arguments on this view are a 
posteriori: they typically hold that a God-actualized world would exhibit 
(or lack) certain features, and that, since the actual world fails (or seem-
ingly fails) to conform to these expectations, it is reasonable to believe 
that God does not exist.4 Since most of these arguments appeal to cer-
tain claims about evil, they may be treated as versions of the problem of 
evil. Such arguments are controversial, and the literature surrounding 
them is vast. 
Recently, a few authors have advanced versions of a remarkable a pri-
ori argument against theism on NPW.5 This argument is ambitious: it 
can be understood to suggest that God's existence is impossible on NPW. 
If sound, then, this argument should force the theist to give up either 
theism or NPW. In what follows, I discuss William L. Rowe's elegant 
and intriguing articulation of this argument. I examine recent responses 
to Rowe's argument due to Bruce Langtry, Thomas Morris, and Daniel 
and Frances Howard-Snyder.6 I conclude that none is successful, but I 
show that Rowe's argument nevertheless requires more defence than he 
provides. The a priori case against theism on NPW, then, not yet com-
plete. 
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I. Rowe's A Priori Argument for Atheism on NPW 
Rowe's exposition of this argument is swift: 
A being is necessarily an absolutely perfect moral being only if it is 
not possible for there to be a being morally better than it. If a being 
creates a world when there is some morally better world that it could 
have created, then it is possible that there be a being morally better 
than it. Since our assumption [NPW] implies that for any world an 
omnipotent being creates there is a morally better world that it can 
create, it follows that ,my such being who creates even a very good 
world cannot be an absolutely perfect moral being. Although the 
omnipotent being in question could be a very good moral agent and 
enjoy a significant degree of freedom in creating among a number of 
very good worlds, it could not be an absolutely perfect moral being. 
The existence of the theistic God who creates a world is inconsistent 
with the supposition that among the worlds he can create there is no 
morally unsurpassable world.7 
The argument in this passage may be formalized in the following manner: 
(1) On NPW, if there is an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good 
being, then it is always possible for that being to actualize a 
morally better world. 
(2) On NPW, if it is always possible for an omniscient, omnipotent, 
perfectly good being to actualize a morally better world, then it 
is always possible for that being to have been morally better. 
(3) Therefore, on NPW, if there is an omniscient, omnipotent, per-
fectly good being, then it is always possible for that being to 
have been morally better. 
(4) On NPW, if ther~ is an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good 
being, then it is not possible for that being to have been morally 
better. 
(5) Therefore, on NPW, there is no omniscient, omnipotent, per-
fectly good being. 
Premise (1) is simply an expression of NPW, and premise (4) is an analytic 
truth. Premise (2) is the crucial move in this argument, since it is required 
for (3), and (3) and (4) together comprise the contradiction that completes 
the reductio of the antecedent of (1). Rowe, it must be noted, offers no 
explicit argument for premise (2). I concur with Bruce Langtry, who, refer-
ring to this premise, holds that J/[w]e ought, in the present context, be dis-
content with any mere appeal to intuition in defence of Rowe's premise, 
but rather demand an argument in favour of it."8 So, why might one hold 
(2)? This premise alleges a connection between the goodness of an actual-
ized world and the goodness of the actualizing agent. Perhaps, then, Rowe 
thinks that, ceteris paribus, in actualizing a better world, one performs a bet-
ter action. And perhaps he also thinks that, ceteris paribus, if one performs a 
better action, one is thereby a better agent: Both claims have been rejected 
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by Rowe's critics, and these moves will be assessed in Sections II, III, and 
IV. Since premise (2) seems to conflate these two distinct claims, it will be 
useful to recast Rowe's argument in a manner that distinguishes them. 
This will also enable us to see better precisely how Rowe's critics engage 
his argument. Suppose, then, that we reformulate Rowe's argument in this 
way: 10 
(6) On NPW, an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being is 
possible. 
(7) On NPW, it is always possible for the product (or outcome) of the 
world-actualizing action of the omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly 
good being to have been better. 
PI If it is possible for the product (or outcome) of a world-actual-
izing action performed by some being to have been better, 
then, ceteris paribus, it is possible for that action to have been 
better.ll 
(8) Therefore, on NPW, it is always possible for the world-actualiz-
ing action of the omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being 
to have been better. 
P2 If it is possible for the world-actualizing action performed by 
some being to have been better, then, ceteris paribus, it is pos-
sible for that being to have been .better. 
(9) Therefore, on NPW, it is always possible for the omnipotent, 
omniscient, perfectly good being to have been better. 
(10) On NPW, it is not possible for an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly 
good being to have been better. 
(11) Therefore, on NPW, no omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly 
good being is possible. 
The argument is now a straightforward reductio of (6).12 Premise (7) is a 
restatement of NPW, and (10) is an analytic truth. (9) and (10) together 
comprise the contradiction required to complete the reductio. The crucial 
moves in this argument, then, are the inference from (7) to (8) and the 
inference from (8) to (9). These inferences are made valid by the inser-
tion of two principles: PI and P2. These, of course, are the principles that 
I suggested might underwrite premise (2) of the first formalization of 
Rowe's argument. It is worth emphasizing that inasmuch as Rowe offers 
no explicit support for (2), he offers no explicit defence of these princi-
ples: they are entirely suppressed in his argument. Bruce Langtry, 
Thomas Morris, and Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder have all recent-
ly criticized these principles. After briefly rejecting the arguments of 
Langtry and Morris in Sections II and III, I offer, in Section IV, a detailed 
analysis and criticism of the Howard-Snyders' complex argument 
against Rowe. 
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II. Langtry's Criticisms of PI 
Langtry offers two criticisms of Rowe, and both can be construed as objec-
tions to PI. Here is the first: 
Does [NPW] imply that for any action actualising a world that God 
can perform there is a morally better alternative action that he can 
perform? No. It is logically necessary that if a being is omnipotent, 
omniscient, and perfectly good then it cannot act in a morally better 
way, or more rationally, than it in fact acts. What [NPW] implies is 
that, given that an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being 
is logically possible, there are worlds V and W such that V is better 
than W, and God can actualise V without violating any moral duty, 
but God's actualising V is not a morally better action, or more rational, 
than his actualising WI! [emphasis added]Y 
If this move is successful, PI founders and the inference from (7) to (8) is 
undercut. Unfortunately, however, this move fails. Notice that Langtry 
offers no argument against PI here. He merely observes that if a perfectly 
good being is logically possible, then PI must be rejected. But Rowe's argu-
ment (as I have construed it) purports to be a reductio of the very claim that 
a perfectly good being is logically possible, and the mere assertion of the 
first premise of a reductio is not sufficient to show that the reductio fails. At 
minimum, independent reasons for asserting such a premise must be estab-
lished. Langtry, in effect, has merely shown he agrees with Rowe in think-
ing that ( NPW, (6), PI ) is an inconsistent set. 14 But he offers no reason for 
thinking that PI should be rejected, rather than, say, (6).15 
In an endnote, Langtry offers a second line of attack against Rowe. He 
identifies and criticizes the following suppressed premise in Rowe's argu-
ment: " ... other things being equal, in intentionally bringing about the bet-
ter state of affairs one acts in the morally better way."16 Since this premise is 
a generalized version of PI, I will take Langtry's subsequent argument to 
be a criticism of this moral principleY Langtry suggests that 
... when a being is choosing a world to create from an infinite hierarchy of 
better and better worlds, the conclusion that one could always have 
acted in a morally better way is defeated by the fact that some worlds 
are good enough. Rejection of what would be entirely acceptable were 
it not for the option of choosing the better would be no sign of superi-
or excellence of character; rather the defective nature of the attitude 
would be shown in the paralysis and self-stultification which it 
induced. IS 
I take it that the second sentence in this passage is meant to support the 
first. (Taken independently, the first statement merely asserts that there are 
good enough worlds: worlds which, in this context, include God's existence. 
But this amounts to another arbitrary rejection of PI, and accordingly does 
not settle the question in Langtry's favour). The argument, then, appears to 
be that PI is false because it would have a paralytic and stultifying effect 
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on the agent who employs it as a rule for action in this context. 
This, however, still does not suffice for the rejection of PI. A further 
premise is required, such as (for instance) the claim that it is impossible 
that God's actions be paralyzed or stultified. But such an assertion just 
amounts to another arbitrary denial of Rowe's claim that (6), not PI, 
should be rejected. In short, Langtry rejects PI because it (together with 
NPW) appears to have unwelcome consequences for theism, but such a 
rejection is unmotivated, because it offers no independent reason for think-
ing PI false. Rowe knows perfectly well that PI and NPW jointly have 
unwelcome consequences for theism: his argument, after all, is an elabora-
tion of this basic insight.19 
Here too, then, the disagreement between Rowe and Langtry can per-
haps best be understood as before. They both appear to agree that { NPW, 
(6), PI } is an inconsistent triad. To resolve this inconsistency, Rowe would 
presumably prefer to argue from NPW and PI to the denial of (6), while 
Langtry, as we have seen, argues from NPW and (1) to the denial of PI. But 
neither offers independent reason for their preference: Rowe offers no 
argument for PI, and Langtry offers no argument for (6). This debate, then, 
ends in stalemate. 
III. Thomas Morris' Criticisms ofP2 
Thomas Morris does not address PI, but instead offers a criticism of P2. 
His strategy is to suggest and attack two claims that might be thought to 
underwrite this principle:2u 
The Production Thesis: The goodness of an agent's actions is productive 
of the agent's goodness. 
The Expression Thesis: The goodness of an agent's actions is expressive 
of the agent's goodness. 
Morris concedes that something like the production thesis may be true for 
human beings: "Since at least the time of Aristotle, we have realized that 
we can become good, at least in part, by doing good."2l He denies, though, 
that the production thesis applies to God: 
[I]f anything like the production thesis is true of any sorts of beings at 
all, it is true only of beings with moral potential. A greatest possible 
being is by definition not a being with moral potential. Thus, to 
assume the unrestricted truth of the production thesis is just to beg 
the question against perfect being theology.22 
As for the expression thesis, Morris thinks that this may be trivially true of 
human beings: however we act, even when we act akratically, we express 
our goodness (or lack thereof). And he thinks that God's goodness is 
expressed in his actions.23 But he denies that this expressive connection 
holds perfectly in God's case on NPW: 
... failing to do the best you can is a flaw or manifests an incomplete-
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ness in moral character in this way only if doing the best you can is at 
least a logical possibility. If doing the best he can in creating a world 
is for God an impossibility [on NPW] ... then not doing his best in 
creating cannot be seen as a flaw or as manifesting an incompleteness 
in the character of God. The notion of a perfect expression of an 
unsurpassable character would then itself be an incoherence. To 
assume otherwise would, again, just be to beg the question against 
perfect being theology.24 
So Morris thinks that neither argument for P2 has merit, and, accordingly, 
that P2 should be rejected. 
Strictly speaking, it is not clear that Morris' argument concerning the 
expression thesis engages Rowe: Rowe, recall, does not fault God for hav-
ingfailed to do his best in actualizing a world on NPW. Rowe's point, rather, 
is that no matter what a being does on NPW with respect to world-actual-
ization, that being is surpassable, in which case no such being can be God.25 
Leaving this aside, it is clear that Morris' arguments concerning the pro-
duction thesis and the expression thesis have a common form: they both 
allege that since these the thesis in question cannot sensibly apply to God, 
it should not be used to support P2. In short, then, Morris' point seems to 
be this: since the notion of a perfectly good being is coherent on NPW, P2 
should be rejected. But this, like Langtry's argument, merely amounts to an 
assertion of the first premise of Rowe's reductio, and, again, no such mere 
assertion can undermine a reductio: independent argumentation is 
required.26 
Morris thus appears to agree with Rowe that the following triad is 
inconsistent: { NPW, (6), P2 }.27 And, while Rowe would presumably 
endorse NPW and P2 in order to reject (6), Morris endorses (6) and NPW 
in order to reject P2. But neither author offers any independent argument 
for their preference: as noted, Rowe does not argue for P2, nor does Morris 
argue for (6). This debate too, then, ends in stalemate. 
IV. The Howard-Snyders' Criticism of Rowe 
Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder advance an argument that purports to 
show that, contra Rowe, perfect being theology is not incoherent on NPW. 
It is not clear from the text whether their argument is to be construed as a 
denial of PI or a denial of P2, but if their argument is successful, at least 
one of these principles is false.28 In this section, I outline and criticize their 
complex argument. 
Jove's Use of a Randomizing Device 
In "How an Unsurpassable Being can Create A Surpassable World", 
Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder introduce a novel thought-experi-
ment. They imagine a being named Jove who is omnipotent, omniscient, 
and unsurpassably good, and who is unable to actualize a prime world, 
there being none. Jove divides the set of all possible worlds into two sub-
sets based on certain axiologically-relevant criteria.29 Worlds in the better 
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subset are given unique ordinals: the worst of the lot receives '1', the sec-
ond-worst '2', and so on.w Jove selects from these worlds at random, and 
world no. 777 is actualized.3I The Howard-Snyders conclude that Jove's 
" ... creating a world inferior to one he or some other possible being could 
have created does nothing to impugn his status as essentially morally 
unsurpassable in any respect whatsoever."32 
To defend this strong claim, the Howard-Snyders consider three 
alternative actions that a being in Jove's situation might perform, and they 
conclude that none is morally better than Jove's action.33 First, the Howard-
Snyders imagine that Jove might create nothing, such that the resulting 
world contains only Jove and whatever other necessarily-existing entities 
there may be. They argue that this course of action is not morally preferable 
to the use of the randomizer, since world no.777 has much to recommend 
it over the world that results when Jove creates nothing.34 Second, they 
imagine that another perfect being, Juno, uses the randomizer and actual-
izes world no.999. They hold that Juno's action is no better than Jove's, 
smce 
[fjactors outside of one's control can make a difference to how much 
good one brings about without making a difference to how good one 
is. Jove has no control over what number his randomizer will deliver. 
Thus, given his resolve to let the device do its thing, it is not up to 
him which [world] ... is actualized. And precisely the same can be 
said about Juno. Thus, even if a better world results from Juno's 
using the device, that's no reason to infer that she is morally better 
thanJove.~' 
So far, the Howard-Snyders' case is un controversial. Some controversy has 
arisen concerning the third alternative action that they propose, however, 
and so I tum to this now. 
Thor's Action and Rowe's Criticism 
The Howard-Snyders next imagine that an omnipotent and omniscient 
being, Thor, eschews the randomizer and instead actualizes world no.888. 
The Howard-Snyders reject two reasons for thinking that Thor is better 
than Jove. They first urge that, ceteris paribus, Thor's putative bettemess 
cannot 
... consist in the fact that Thor actualized a better world than Jove. 
For given that Jove and Juno are morally equivalent, if Thor is better 
than Jove, then he's better than Juno; but the world Thor actualizes is 
inferior to the world Juno actualizes. So if Thor is better than Jove, it 
must be in virtue of some other difference between them.36 
Second, they urge that Thor's attitude (in rejecting the randomizer) must 
not be thought superior to Jove's attitude: 
The important point to see here is that given a choice between infi-
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nitely many progressively better worlds to actualize, Jove wisely 
rejects Thor's principle that if there's a better world than w, don't cre-
ate W, not because he is casual or uncaring or objectionably settling 
for less, but because that principle in that context would lead him 
(and Thor, were he rational) to do nothing, which is far worse than 
using the randomizer [emphasis added].37 
William Rowe objects to this last point. He suggests that Thor " ... selects 
world no. 888 over Jove's world no. 777 because he sees that it is better and 
prefers creating no. 888 to creating any lesser world."38 Accordingly, Rowe 
thinks that Thor cannot be following the principle that the Howard-
Snyders impute to him, for if he were, he would not settle for 888: " ... 
knowing that he must select among infinitely many progressively better 
worlds, such a principle would prohibit Thor from creating the world he 
does create, no. 888."39 
Rowe's point here is unfair to the spirit (if not, perhaps, the letter) of the 
Howard-Snyders' argument. The Howard-Snyders do not mean to suggest 
that Thor acts on this principle; clearly, he doesn't. Rather, they meant to 
point out that if Thor adopts this principle, since he knows that there is no 
prime world, his decision to actualize world no.888 is irrational, and, 
accordingly, Thor cannot be an unsurpassable being.40 In any event, Rowe 
offers a new argument for the conclusion that Thor is morally better than 
Jove: 
Thor's degree of moral goodness presumably is such that he is pre-
pared to settle for world no. 888, but not to settle for the world 
(no.777) that Jove's degree of moral goodness allows him to settle for. 
We thus have reason to believe that Thor's degree of moral goodness 
exceeds Jove's, that Thor is morally better than Jove.41 
If Thor is morally better them Jove, then Jove is - after all - a surpassable 
being, and the Howard-Snyders' argument fails. 
The Howard-Snyders' Response to Rowe 
Recently, the Howard-Snyders have responded to this argument.42 Crucial 
premises of their response tum on the sorting process that a prospective cre-
ator would use to bisect the set of all worlds into (i) a set of worlds the 
being is unprepared to actualize; and (ii) a set of worlds the being is prepared 
to actualize. The Howard-Snyders' original paper explained this process as 
follows: 
Although [Jove] can create any [world], he can't create the best of 
them because there is no best. Faced with this predicament, Jove first 
sorts the worlds according to certain criteria. For example, he puts on 
his left worlds in which some inhabitants live lives that aren't worth 
living and on his right worlds in which every inhabitant's life is 
worth living; he puts on his left worlds in which some horrors fail to 
serve some outweighing good and on his right worlds in which no 
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horror fails to serve an outweighing good. (We encourage the reader 
to use her own criteria). Then he orders the right hand worlds 
according to their goodness and assigns to each a positive natural 
number, the worst of the lot receiving '1', the second worst '2', and so 
on.43 
Since Jove's randomizer selects from all the 'right-hand' worlds, Jove must 
be prepared to actualize anyone of them.44 
The Howard-Snyders agree with Rowe that the salient difference 
between Jove and Thor is that Thor, unlike Jove, is prepared to settle for 
888 (even though there are infinitely many better worlds) but unprepared 
to settle for 777. They further suppose that" ... Thor, unlike Jove, is not pre-
pared to settle for any world less than no. 888" .45 Jove thus bisects the set of 
all possible worlds at (just below) world no. 1, while Thor bisects the set of 
all possible worlds at (just below) no. 888. The Howard-Snyders' argument 
begins with the following disjunction:46 
(12) Thor either has or lacks a principle that justifies his unwilling-
ness to settle for any world less than no. 888. 
The Howard-Snyders think that any principle that justifies a bisection must 
satisfy the following conditions:47 
(i) It divides the set of possible worlds into two groups (the accept-
able and the unacceptable);48 
(ii) It is a reasonable principle that a morally good being might well 
use to sort worlds (i.e. it is neither morally defective nor wholly 
frivolous); 
(iii) It is such that it is not irrational [or immoral] to act in accor-
dance with it without acting in accordance with one which 
expresses a higher standard.49 
Such principles can be ranked: a principle that justifies a bisection at (just 
below) world x is higher than a principle that justifies a bisection at (just 
below) world y just in case x is a better world than y. And the Howard-
Snyders appear to assume that the higher the principle, the better that prin-
ciple is.50 It is clear that on NPW, there are infinitely many possible points 
at which to bisect the set of all possible worlds. If each of these bisections 
could be justified by a principle that meets conditions (i)-(iii), then there 
would be no highest principle justifying a bisection: for any such principle, 
a higher (and better) principle would be possible. The Howard-Snyders 
reject this view. Their argument may be expressed as follows: 
(13) Either there is a highest principle that satisfies conditions (i)-
(iii), or there is not. 
(14) There is a highest principle that satisfies (i)-(iii).sl 
(15) Jove acts on this principle.52 
(16 Therefore, no being can act on a higher principle than Jove's 
principle. 
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(17) Therefore, Thor lacks a principle for being unprepared to settle 
for any world less than 888. 
The Howard-Snyders have a very strategic reason for asserting (14). If (14) 
is false, they fear that Rowe might argue in the following manner: 
It is possible for Thor to act on a principle which was neither morally 
defective nor frivolous nor such that anyone who embraced it would 
be rationally compelled to rule out more and more worlds ad infini-
tum. But since for every principle there is one which expresses a high-
er standard, Jove had to embrace one which was not the highest. For 
any principle Jove possibly embraces, however, I stipulate that Thor 
embraces a higher one that would result in his treating as unaccept-
able some worlds that Jove would treat as acceptable. Thus, Thor is 
necessarily morally superior to Jove ... 53 
To block this move, then, the Howard-Snyders assert (14) and stipulate, in 
(15), that Jove acts on the highest partition principle there is. The Howard-
Snyders' dialectical reason for asserting (14), then, is clear. But what are 
their philosophical reasons? The Howard-Snyders make just three claims in 
defense of (14): 
(iv) "It seems odd to say the least that there should be infinitely 
many such general principles."54 
(v) "At least we see no reason to accept that there are [infinitely 
many such general principles]."55 
(vi) " .. .it is not reasonable to believe that there are infinitely many 
principles which satisfy constraints (i)_(iii)."56 
By themselves, these claims do not constitute an argument for (14). I will 
return to this point below. First, however, the remainder of the Howard-
Snyders' argument must be outlined. Having concluded that Thor lacks a 
good principle for bisecting just below no. 888, the Howard-Snyders con-
tinue with an argument best expressed as a constructive dilemma:57 
(18) Since Thor lacks such a principle, either he selects no. 888 arbi-
trarily, or he is determined by his nature to select no. 888. 
(19) If Thor is determined by his nature to select no. 888, then his 
unpreparedness to select a world worse than no. 888 is nothing 
other than a tendency to act in accordance with (as opposed to a 
tendency to act on) a principle that satisfies conditions (i)-(iii). 
(20) Either there is a highest principle that satisfies conditions (i)-
(iii), or there is not. 
(21) There is a highest principle that satisfies (i)-(iii). 
(22) Jove acts on this principle. 
(23), Therefore, no being can act in accordance with a higher principle 
than Jove's principle. 
(24) Therefore, if Thor is determined by his nature to select no. 888, 
Jove is morally unsurpassable. 
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(25) If Thor selects no. 888 arbitrarily, then he is not morally better 
than Jove. 
(26) Therefore, if Thor selects no. 888 arbitrarily, Jove is morally 
unsurpassable. 
(27) Jove is morally unsurpassable. [from (18), (24), and (26)] 
On the Howard-Snyders' story, then, Jove uses an unsurpassable partition 
principle that satisfies (i)-(iii) in order to sort worlds, and then randomly 
selects a world from the higher subset for actualization. For any world 
selected by the randomizer, there are infinitely many better worlds that 
Jove has the power to actualize. But were Jove (or anybody else) to actual-
ize any world better than the one selected by the randomizer, either this 
would not be a better action, or it would be a better action, but Jove (or any-
body else) would not be a better agent for performing it. Thus, if the 
Howard-Snyders' argument concerning Jove is sound, then at least one of 
these moral principles is false: 58 
PI If it is possible for the product / outcome of a world-actualizing 
action performed by some being to have been better, then, 
ceteris paribus, it is possible for that action to have been better. 
P2 If it is possible for the world-actualizing action performed by 
some being to have been better, then, ceteris paribus, it is pos-
sible for that being to have been better. 
Thus the Howard-Snyders conclude that Rowe's argument fails. 
Criticisms of the Howard-Snyders' Defence of Jove 
Premises (18) and (19) may be controversial, but I will not address them in 
what follows. Notice that (21) is identical to (14). I pointed out above that 
the Howard-Snyders offer no argument for (14). The same is true of (21). 
To the extent that these crucial premises are unsupported, then, the 
Howard-Snyders' argument in (12)-(27) is unconvincing. A stronger criti-
cism would, of course, show that (14) and (21) are false, thereby undercut-
ting the Howard-Snyders' argument in two places. I have no such criti-
cism, but I can offer some modest considerations against (14) and (21). 
These reasons are not decisive, but they are, I think, suggestive. I first offer 
these considerations, and I then develop an independent criticism of the 
Howard-Snyders' argument on the concessive assumption that (14) and 
(21) are, after all, true. 
Modest Considerations against (14) and (21) 
The Howard-Snyders suggest several sample partition principles which, 
they claim, satisfy conditions (i)-(iii):59 
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(vii) No world in which beings live lives which are not worth living 
is acceptable; 
(viii) No world in which beings experience gratuitous suffering is 
acceptable; 
(ix) No world in which beings live lives which are not as happy and 
fulfilled as those lives could possibly be is acceptable; 
(x) No world empty of sentient, rational beings is acceptable. 
Each of these principles suggests a certain property which, if instantiated, 
tends to make the resulting world good. (Let's call these world-good-making-
properties, or WGMPs). The partition principles (viii)-(x) divide the set of 
possible worlds into those that have, and those that lack, a given WGMP. 
Clearly, there are many different candidate WGMPs, and so many further 
partition principles could be devised in the manner of (vii)-(x). On the 
Howard-Snyders' view, these could be ranked too. 
Now, if there is only a finite number of WGMPs, then there can only be 
a finite number of principles that take the form of (vii)-(x): principles which 
divide the set of possible worlds into those which have and those which 
lack a given WGMP. If so, at least one such principle must be unsurpass-
ably high. But there is absolutely no reason to think that there is a finite 
number of WGMPs. And if there is an infinite number of WGMPs, then, 
possibly, there is no highest principle that takes the form of (vii}-(x) and 
meets conditions (i)-(iii).6() 
It might be replied that this argument illicitly assumes that all partition 
principles take the form of (vii)-(x) by referring only to one WGMP.61 
Perhaps, for example, there is a single partition principle that refers to 
every WGMP that there is, even if there are infinitely many such proper-
ties. (Devising such a principle, of course, would not be a problem for an 
omniscient agent.) This principle would, then, divide the set of possible 
worlds into those in which every WGMP is instantiated, and those in which 
this is not the case. If there were such a principle, it might be thought 
unsurpassable, in which case the Howard-Snyders are entitled to stipulate 
it to be the one that Jove employs. It is not obvious, however, that such a 
principle would be unsurpassable. It is simply not clear that worlds in 
which every WGMP is instantiated are better than those in which not every 
WGMP is instantiated.62 Perhaps at some point, or in certain combinations, 
the instantiation of more WGMPs no longer makes worlds better. Thus this 
proposal fails to show that there is an unsurpassable partition principle.63 
Moreover, this proposal assumes that every WGMP is an "all-or-noth-
ing" property, and this, I believe, is false. Many plausible WGMPs are 
degreed properties; indeed, advocates of NPW typically rely on just such 
properties to support NPW, since, they argue, there are some WGMPs that 
simply cannot be maximally instantiated in some world. Richard 
Swinburne, Bruce Reichenbach, and George SchleSinger all argue in this 
manner.64 Richard Swinburne takes this view in the following passage: 
... take any world W. Presumably the goodness of such a world ... 
will consist in part in it containing a finite or infinite number of con-
scious beings who will enjoy it. But if this enjoyment of the world by 
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each is a valuable thing, surely a world with a few more conscious 
beings in it would be a yet more valuable world - for there would be 
no reason why the existence of the latter should detract from the 
enjoyment of the world by others - they would always be put some 
considerable distance away from others, so that there was no mutual 
interference. I conclude that it is not, for conceptual reasons, plausible 
to suppose that there could be a best of all possible worlds, and in 
consequence God could not have overriding reason to create one.os 
This passage seems to suggest the following WGMP: 
(xi) There being a great number of conscious beings who enjoy the 
world. 
This WGMP can fail to be instantiated at all in a world, but, there being no 
unsurpassably great number, it seems that this WGMP cannot be maximally 
instantiated in any world. 66 
Bruce Reichenbach offers a more general account of how worlds 
might be thought better and better ad infinitum: 
What sorts of states of affairs are counted as the most beneficial or 
optimific? Hedonism suggests states of affairs which produce plea-
sure; utilitarianism suggests utility; eudaimonism, happiness. Other 
possibilities would include the production of the most virtue, moral 
goodness, or goodwill in the world. But no matter which of these be 
accepted, whether individually or in combination, ... one could 
imagine an infinite series of optimific states in which for any amount 
of optimific states of affairs n, one could conceive of n+ 1 states of 
affairs, or considered qualitatively for any degree of optimificity in 
the world one could conceive of even more optimificity ... Thus there 
could be no best possible world, since for any world which we could 
name there would always be another which was more optimific.67 
On this view, another WGMP would be: 
(xii) The world's being comprised of optimific states of affairs. 
Again, while this property may fail to obtain in some worlds, it seems that 
- if Reichenbach is right - this property cannot be maximally instantiated 
in any given world. 
George Schlesinger argues in similar fashion, employing the still more 
general notion of the U degree of desirability of a state" (DDS). Schlesinger 
does not say precisely wherein the DDS consists, but it appears that the 
desirability of a state is equivalent to the goodness of that state. (States need 
not be desired in order to be desirable, nor desirable in order to be 
desired.)iiH The desirability of a state can thus be mapped against an 
absolute external scale, and Schlesinger urges that this scale has no upper 
limit: 
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Now I take it that, conceptually, there is no limit to the degree which 
the desirability of a state may reach ... A mortal's possibilities are 
physically limited, hence there is, in his case, a natural limit which 
applies to the principle ['increase the DDS as much as possible'] but 
there is no limit to what God can do. It is, therefore, logically impossi-
ble for him to fulfill the ethical principle, i.e., to do enough to dis-
charge his obligation to raise the DDS of every creature to the height 
beyond which he cannot increase it. Just as it is logically impossible 
to name the highest integer, it is impossible to grant a creature a DDS 
higher than which is inconceivable; thus it is logically impossible for 
God to fulfill what is required by the universal ethical principle and 
therefore he cannot fulfill it, and is therefore not obliged to fulfill it.69 
Schlesinger'S WGMP, then, is 
(xiii) The states of affairs' (that comprise creaturely existence in the 
world) being desirable. 
Again, while worlds may lack property (xiii), on Schlesinger's account, 
there is no world in which property (xiii) is unsurpassably instantiated. 
These degreed WGMPs can be used to develop partition-justifying prin-
ciples that do not take the form of (vii)-(x). Consider these examples: 
(xiv) No world below level L (at which there are fewer than x con-
scious free creatures who enjoy the world) is acceptable;70 
(xv) No world in which the optimificity of the states of affairs that com-
prise that world falls below level L is acceptable; 
(xvi) No world in which the desirability of the states of affairs that com-
prise creaturely existence in that world falls below level L is 
acceptable. 
(Equally, of course, these degreed WGMPs might be included in partition 
principles that refer to many WGMPs.) For consistency, the Howard-
Snyders should presumably insist there is some maximum level L beyond 
which all putative partition-justifying principles fail to satisfy at least one 
of critiera (i)-(iii). But why should all putative principles beyond some such 
level L be morally defective, frivolous, or such that their invocation renders 
the invoking agent irrational? Such an insistence seems entirely at odds 
with the very reasons that motivate NPW. So it is very difficult to imagine 
how the Howard-Snyders could consistently argue for this view. 
The Howard-Snyders assert (14) and (21) - the claim that there is an 
unsurpassable partition principle - in order to next stipulate that Jove acts 
on this principle. They stipulate this in order to block Rowe from stipulat-
ing that Thor acts on a higher principle than Jove's. I have offered modest 
considerations against (14) and (21). While these considerations are not 
decisive, they do suggest that the Howard-Snyders' insistence that there is 
a highest partition principle requires significant argument in order to be 
compelling. That said, it can be shown that Jove is surpassable even if (14) 
and (21) are granted. I take up this task next. 
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Jove's Surpassibility Granting (14) and (21) 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that (14) and (21) are granted. 
Suppose, in other words, that the Howard-Snyders are right to assert 
that there is an unsurpassable partition principle that a being could 
use to bisect the set of possible worlds. Even in this case it can be 
shown that Jove - who, by stipulation, uses such a principle - is sur-
passable. To see this, notice that there is a logical distinction between 
the partition principle a creator uses to bisect the set of possible 
worlds and the 'subsequent' decision procedure he uses to select a 
world for actualization from the higher subset. Since I am here granti-
ng (14) and (21), I assume that a being who selects a world from that 
subset cannot possibly act on or act in accordance with a higher princi-
ple than Jove's. But does it follow tout court that such a being cannot 
be better than Jove? 
No. Consider Odin, an exceedingly good, omnipotent, omniscient 
being, who faces the world-actualization problem on NPW. Odin divides 
possible worlds according to the highest partition-justifying principle that 
there is: Jove's principle. Whereas Jove proceeds to select randomly from 
the upper subset of worlds, Odin employs the following decision proce-
dure: he takes the ordinal selected by Jove's randomizer, adds one, and 
actualizes the resulting world. Whatever world Jove actualizes, then, Odin 
actualizes one better. 
This thought-experiment is not frivolous: it shows that Jove is surpass-
able. Odin is certainly no worse than Jove (on the Howard-Snyders' analy-
sis) with respect to the partition-justifying principle he chooses, since he 
too uses the highest such principle that there (by hypothesis) is: Jove's prin-
ciple. His logically-subsequent decision procedure invariably results in bet-
ter outcomes than does Jove's, so there is at least some reason to think that 
he, Odin, is better than Jove l Odin may perhaps be surpassable, but even 
if surpassable, if he is superior to Jove (by virtue of employing a logically-
subsequent decision procedure that always returns a better outcome), then, 
ceteris paribus, Jove is, after all, surpassable. 
The Howard-Snyders might object that Odin, as described, does not in 
fact use Jove's partition principle. Such an argument might proceed as fol-
lows: 
Odin will never actualize Jove's world no.l, since, even if Jove's ran-
domizer generates no.l, Odin will actualize world no.2. Therefore, 
Odin's set of actualizable worlds, in effect, differs from Jove's, in 
which case Odin must be using a partition principle different from 
Jove's. And, since Jove's partition principle (by stipulation) is unsur-
passable, Odin's cannot be better, and so it is false that Odin is better 
than Jove. 
While it is true that Odin will never actualize world no.l, this cannot by 
itself show that Odin's partition principle differs from Jove's. There is, after 
all, an important distinction between partition principles and logically-sub-
sequent decision procedures, and, as described, Odin and Jove differ only 
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with respect to the latter. I urged earlier that the Howard-Snyders' account 
of partitioning should be construed to mean the right-hand worlds are 
prima facie acceptable for actualization, and so there is no inconsistency 
between Odin's finding a certain set of worlds (namely, Jove's set) prima 
facie acceptable for actualization, and its being the case that Odin will 
never, in fact, actualize the worst world in that set, no.I." Indeed, if it 
shows anything at all, this objection suggests another reason for thinking 
that Odin is better than Jove: not only will Odin always actualize a better 
world than the one that Jove actualizes, Odin, unlike Jove, will never actu-
alize world no.1. So much the better, say I, for Odin! 
Alternatively, the Howard-Snyders might concede that Odin is better 
than Jove in virtue of always actualizing a better world, but insist that Odin 
does not surpass Jove on the whole, since Odin uses a decision procedure 
that is suspect in some way. In particular, the Howard-Snyders might 
claim that Odin's decision procedure is suspect because it fails to satisfy 
some new conditions, such as these variants of (ii) and (iii): 
(ii') It is a reasonable decision procedure that a morally good being 
might well use to select worlds (Le. it is neither morally defec-
tive nor wholly frivolous); 
(iii') It is a decision procedure such that it is not irrational [or immoral] 
to act on or in accordance with it without acting on or in accor-
dance with one which expresses a higher standard. 
But, while Odin's decision procedure may not satisfy these new conditions, 
it would be unreasonable to require that it should, since these are variants 
of necessary conditions on the partition principle of an unsurpassable being, 
and Odin is not advanced as a candidate for this post: I argue only that 
Odin surpasses Jove. In short, these alleged deficiencies in Odin can show 
at most that he is surpassable, not that he fails to surpass Jove. They are 
therefore irrelevant to the issue at hand. Odin's decision procedure, I sub-
mit, is no stranger, and no more arbitrary, than Jove's decision procedure. 
In fact, it contrasts favourably with Jove's, since it always returns a better 
outcome, and this provides reason for thinking that Jove is, after all, sur-
passable. So this imagined reply also misses the mark. 
The Howard-Snyders intended to defend the unsurpassability of Jove in 
order to undermine Rowe's a priori argument for atheism. If, that is, Jove 
(as described) could exist on NPW, then Rowe's argument fails, either 
because PI fails or because P2 fails?3 The Howard-Snyders' argument for 
the unsurpassability of Jove turns on the claim that there is a finite number 
of partition principles, and that Jove acts on the highest of these. I first 
argued that the Howard-Snyders have not shown that there are only finite-
ly many such principles, and I suggested that there may well be infinitely 
many. I then urged that even if there is a highest principle, it does not fol-
low that Jove is unsurpassable, since it is reasonable to believe that Jove's 
decision procedure for selecting a world for actualization is surpassable. 
Thus, the Howard-Snyders' effort to undermine Rowe's argument is 
unsuccessful. 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
William Rowe's a priori argument for atheism is elegant, and it may be 
thought to appeal to some plausible moral intuitions. I have shown that it 
withstands Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder's complex criticism. 
Further, I have shown that neither Langtry's criticisms of PI nor Morris' 
objections to P2 are decisive, since they depend on assumptions which 
Rowe would reject. But, of course, this does not mean that Rowe's argu-
ment is sound. Space does not permit a detailed criticism of this argument 
itself, but I should point out that its success depends on the unrestricted 
truth of PI and P2. As I noted above, Rowe conflates these crucial premises 
in his exposition. To the extent that these principles are undefended, then, 
Rowe's argument is insufficiently supported. Attention to this matter may 
provide the most fruitful avenue for further discussion of this intriguing 
argument.74 
University of Toronto 
NOTES 
1. The expression 'prime world' in this context is due to Bruce Langtry in 
"God and the Best", Faith and Philosophy 13 (1996): 311-328. NPW differs from 
NBW (the view that there is no best world) only if there are possible worlds that 
God cannot actualize. In what follows, I will remain neutral on whether there 
are such worlds, and, therefore, neutral on whether NPW differs from NBW. 
Space does not permit a detailed excursion into difficult questions concerning 
what sorts of factors contribute to (or detract from) the goodness of worlds, how 
these factors so contribute (or detract), whether all worlds are commensurable, 
etc. I will simply assume for the sake of discussion that worlds can be ranked in 
terms of goodness, and in Section IV, I will assume (for simplicity only) that 
there are no ties, and that all worlds are commensurable. 
2. In fact, the distinction is not always drawn between NPW and NBW, 
and so some authors urge that if there is no best world, it follows that God can-
not sensibly be expected to do his best in creating a world. Thus Peter Forrest 
suggests that "[i]t is plausible that for every possible world there could be a 
better one ... If this is the case, God could not create the best possible world, 
just as he could not name the greatest integer" ("The Problem of Evil: Two 
Neglected Defences", Sophia 20 (1981): 52. Similar arguments can be found in 
Reichenbach, B., "Must God Create the Best Possible World?", International 
Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1979): 203-212, and Evil and a Good God, New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1982, Chapter 6; Schlesinger, G. Religion and 
Scientific Method, Boston, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1977, Chapter 9); 
Swinburne, R, The Existence of God, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, 113-114, 
144ff; and Kretzmann, N., "A Particular Problem of Creation: Why Would God 
Create This World?", in Being and Goodness [5. MacDonald, Ed.], Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991, 229-250. 
3. William Wainwright observes that 
[t]he critic complains that God could have created a better order. But 
even if God had created a better order, he would be exposed to the possi-
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bility of a similar complaint [on NPW]. Indeed, [on NPW] no created 
order is such that God would not be exposed to the possibility of a com-
plaint of this sort. The complaint is thus inappropriate. Even though 
there are an infinite number of created orders better than our own, God 
can't be faulted simply because He created an order inferior to other 
orders that He might have created in their place (Philosophy of Religion, 
Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988,90). 
Note that Wainwright only intends to defend theism against the specific 
(but abstract) charge that God could have created a better world than the actual 
world on NPW. William Rowe endorses this defence in "The Problem of 
Divine Perfection and Freedom", in Reasoned Faith [Stump, E., Ed.], Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993,230. 
4. Arguments of this form on NPW are discussed in Basinger, D. "In What 
Sense Must God Be Omnibenevolent?", International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 14 (1983): 3-15; Chrzan, K. "The Irrelevance of the No Best Possible 
World Defense", Philosophia 17 (1987): 161-166; Elliot, R. "Divine Perfection, 
Axiology, and the No Best World Defence", Religious Studies 29 (1993): 533-542; 
and Kretzmann, N. "A Particular Problem of Creation". 
5. William Rowe offers this argument in "The Problem of Divine 
Perfection and Freedom", 230. Others who discuss a similar argument include 
Stephen Grover (in "Why Only the Best is Good Enough", Analysis 48 (1988): 
224); Jeff Jordan (in liThe Problem of Divine Exclusivity", International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 33 (1993): 92££), and Norman Kretzmann (in" A 
Particular Problem of Creation", 238). Strictly speaking, such arguments are 
not arguments from evil, since they are a priori. Rather, they might best be 
understood as arguments from claims concerning the surpassability of world-actual-
izing agents on NPW. 
6. Howard-Snyder, D. and Howard-Snyder, F., "How an Unsurpassable 
Being can Create a Surpassable World", Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994): 260-268; 
Langtry, B., "God and the Best"; and Morris, T., "Perfection and Creation", in 
Reasoned Faith [E. Stump, Ed.], Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993,234-247. 
7. "The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom", 230. 
8. "God and the Best", note 8, 327. 
9. Commenting on Rowe's argument, William Morris states that 
"[s]imply put, the idea seems to be that, all else equal, the better the product, 
the better the act; the better the act, the better the agent" ("Perfection and 
Creation", 241). 
10. Rowe's original argument refers to the moral goodness of worlds. I have 
dropped this modifier in (6)-(11), since it is both implausible and unnecessary. 
It is implausible because moral goodness is best understood to be a feature of 
actions or perhaps agents, rather than a feature of states of affairs such as worlds. 
And it is unnecessary because Rowe's argument does not depend on this mod-
ifier in any way. (For a simpler formalization of Rowe's argument that retains 
the reference to the moral goodness of worlds, see Morris, T. "Perfection and 
Creation", 240.) 
11. If the goodness of the world-actualizing action is itself a contributing 
factor to the overall goodness of the resulting world, then, given the ceteris 
paribus clause, PI is trivially true. (The state of affairs consisting in a world-
actualizing action, after all, is included in the state of affairs that comprises that 
world.) Since PI is intended to be a substantive, non-trivial claim, I propose to 
treat the goodness of a world independently of the goodness-conferring role that 
might be played by the relevant actualizing activity. 
Also, while Rowe's original argument refers only to moral betterness, it 
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seems that the being might also be thought better in terms of rationality. For 
this reason, I have refrained from modifying 'better' with 'morally' in PI and 
P2. Bruce Langtry sketches a Rowe-style argument that turns on rationality in 
"God and the Best", 321ff. 
12. Rowe originally argued for the non-existence of God on NPW. The 
argument in (6)-(11) is stronger, since it argues for the impossibility of God on 
NPW. But if God is taken to be a necessary being, this is a distinction without a 
difference. 
13. Langtry, B., "God and the Best", 320. Langtry's position seems consis-
tent with Aquinas' view of the matter: 
When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if 
better is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always 
make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make 
the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not, as 
explained above. If, however, better is taken as an adverb, implying the man-
ner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than he makes it, 
because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies 
the manner of the thing done, He can make something better, because he 
can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards 
the accidents, although not as regards the substance (Summa Theologiae, Q 
25, Art. 6, emphasis added.) 
14. This way of understanding the debate was suggested to me by 
Jonathan Strand's comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I leave out P2 
here, since it is not directly relevant to the discussion between Rowe and 
Langtry. 
15. Langtry may tacitly concede this very point in the following passage: 
It might be objected, "If V is better than W, and God can actualise V 
without violating any moral rules, then it follows that God has better rea-
sons for actualising V than for actualising W, and so that God would be 
acting irrationally if he actualised W rather than V". Either these things do 
not follow, or else an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being is logical-
ly impossible, or else there are prime worlds [emphasis added, "God and the 
Best", 320]. 
Rowe, I take it, would agree. 
16. ibid., n.S, 327. 
17. Though Langtry formulates this principle in a general manner, he 
objects to its application to the context of world-actualization, and so Langtry's 
objection can properly be understood as a criticism of PI. 
IS. "God and the Best", n.S, 327. 
19. In his commentary on an earlier version of this paper, Wes Morriston 
holds that P1 naturally suggests two rules for action: 
(Rl) Always do the action with the better possible outcome; and 
(R2) For any possible act A, if there is an alternative possibility with a 
better outcome, then don't do A. 
Morriston continues: "But then surely Langtry's point is correct. If there 
were no best possible outcome [on NPW], (R2) would indeed lead to paralysis. 
Consequently, I think he might argue with some plausibility that Rl and R2 
are not acceptable rules for the no prime world situation. If this is right, then 
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God's failure to follow them in this special case would not demonstrate a 
moral defect" ("Commentary on Klaas Kraay's 'William Rowe's A Priori 
Argument from Evil''', Pacific AP A 2002, 3.) I agree that God's failure to follow 
these rules would not demonstrate a moral defect. But Rowe, I think, does not 
mean to suggest that it would. Rowe's point, rather, is that no matter what a 
being does with respect to world-actualization on NPW, that being is always 
surpassable (in which case no being can be God on NPW). In other words, for 
Rowe, the logical impossibility of following such a rule on NPW counts against 
the possibility of God's existence, not against the rule. I argue below, however, 
that this identification of (6) as the culprit - rather than P1- is unmotivated. 
Morriston also suggests a different argument supporting Langtry's con-
clusion: perhaps " ... God does not fail to actualize a better world because he is 
indifferent to higher levels of goodness, but because his desire to actualize a 
very good world is so strong that it cannot be defeated by the fact that there is 
no best world for him to choose" (ibid). Rowe, it seems, could agree both that a 
creative agent need not be indifferent to higher levels of goodness, and that 
such an agent could have a strong and laudable desire to actualize a very good 
world. But Rowe remains free to suggest that on NPW, such a creative agent is 
always surpassable, in which no such agent can be God. 
20. "Perfection and Creation", 242. 
21. ibid. 
22. ibid., 243. 
23. ibid., 244. I thank Wes Morriston for reminding me of this. 
24. ibid. 
25. An anonymous referee suggests that the NPW situation is, in one cru-
cial respect, similar to an alternate scenario on which there are very many 
equally-good worlds, all of which are unsurpassable. In both cases, this referee 
holds, God's inability to actualize the best world (there being none) should not 
count against God. This is true, but, like Morris' argument concerning the 
expression thesis, it is not directly relevant. The claim at issue is not that God is 
surpassable on NPW because he fails to actualize the best world; rather, God is 
held to be surpassable on NPW for having failed to actualize a better world. 
26. One way to offer independent argument against P2 would be to claim 
that it is objectionable, since it depends on a view concerlling the relationship 
between the goodness of actions and the goodness of agents that is simply 
implausible in human affairs. Strictly speaking, Morris' arguments do not take 
this form, since he concentrates on the logical point that neither the production 
thesis nor the expression thesis could sensibly apply to God. That said, Morris 
does seem committed to the other claim in the following passage: 
Suppose that I give you five dollars. I could have given you ten, but I 
give you five. Suppose you do not particularly need the gift, nor do you 
need to be the recipient of a gift. Suppose, in other words, that it's pure 
supererogation on my part. I do a good deed that did not need to be 
done. If someone else instead had given you ten dollars, would it have 
been the case that she did a better deed than 17 Would she, therefore, all 
else equal, have been a better person than 17 I'm not convinced that this 
follows at all (241). 
And, referring to this argument a few pages later, Morris dellies " ... that 
even in the human domain supererogation is always productive of the good in 
any highly specific, additive way" (243). 
I am sympathetic to Morris' rejection of a specific, additive relationship 
between the goodness of supererogatory actions and the goodness of human 
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agents. It does seem implausible to suppose that there is a law-like connection 
between even marginally-better supererogatory actions and the goodness of 
human agents. And Morris' point is to some degree relevant to the case of 
divine world-actualization, since this is standardly held to be an act of pure 
supererogation. That said, I do not think that Morris' claims concerning human 
supererogation count against P2, for P2 does not depend on there being such a 
strict, additive relationship between actions and agents. P2, recall, holds only 
that if it is possible for the world-actualizing action performed by some being to 
be better, then, ceteris paribus, it is possible for that being to have been better. 
On NPW, for any world that God actualizes, there are infinitely-many better 
worlds that God could have actualized instead. Granting PI, then, there are 
then infinitely-many better actions that God could have performed. If the per-
formance of even one of these actions would entail that the world-actualizer is a 
better agent, then P2 stands, notwithstanding Morris' argument. And it seems 
implauSible to suppose that the performance of none of these infinitely many 
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